Human behavior is strongly driven by the pursuit of rewards. In daily life, however, benefits 24 mostly come at a cost, often requiring that effort be exerted in order to obtain potential benefits. 25
Introduction

4
(Predicted Response Outcome model, PRO model, Alexander & Brown, 2011) . This 73 mechanism allows rapid prediction updating according to environmental feedback, be it an 74 error, a painful stimulus, or a reward. An extended version of the same model, the Hierarchical 75
Error Representation model (HER, , expands the same 76 computational principle in a hierarchical architecture, capturing more complex high-level 77 cognitive processes involving the interaction of MPFC and dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC), 78 typically associated with higher-level cognitive functions such as working memory and goal-79 maintenance (Miller & Cohen, 2001) . 80
The goal of this manuscript is to explore the power of these computational accounts, in terms of 81 generating novel neural and behavioral predictions for untested contexts and populations. These 82 frameworks have proven useful across several fields of cognition, yet they have not been put to 83 test in the field of effortful behavior and motivation. Goal-directed behavior generally involves 84 competing factors, including the value of the prospective goals, how much effort one is willing 85 to exert to attain the desired goal, and preparation for the necessary effortful performance 86 (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Westbrook & Braver, 2013 . First, we will describe MPFC 87 involvement in effort-based behavior. Then, we illustrate how the PRO model can be 88 generalized to the domain of motivation. We propose that MPFC activity reflects monitoring of 89 motivationally relevant variables such as reward and required effort, instead of coding an 90 explicit cost-benefit or choice signal per se. We illustrate novel model-based simulations, as 91 well as theoretical predictions, which can be used to guide further empirical enquiry. We 92 discuss how the PRO framework makes neural and behavioral predictions for clinical 93 conditions in which motivation is impaired, such as depression and other psychiatric disorders 94 (Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, & Zald, 2012) . Subsequently, we discuss the future directions in 95 translating the HER model to the domain of motivation, extrapolating behavioral predictions. 96 7 discrepancies between predictions and observations. Using these two primary signals as an 146 index of MPFC activity, the PRO model has previously been shown to account for a range of 147 effects observed in MPFC related to cognitive control and decision making, including effects of 148 error, conflict, and error likelihood. Critically, the PRO model explains these effects without 149 reference to the underlying affective import: feedback related to behavioral error is equivalent 150 to feedback indicating correct behavior in the sense that both forms of feedback constitute an 151 outcome that can be predicted on the basis of task-related stimuli. An open question, therefore, 152
is how the PRO model might be extended to account for effects in which behavior is influenced 153 not only by the likelihood of an event occurring, but also by the value of that event. According to the PRO framework, MPFC activity encodes prediction error, resulting in 159 increased activity for more unexpected (surprising) events. However, several studies 160 investigating effort-based behavior report increased activity in the same region of MPFC when 161 more effort needs to be invested (i.e. in presence of a more demanding task, Krebs et al., 2012; 162 Vassena, Silvetti, et al., 2014) . To reconcile this apparent inconsistency, we hypothesize that 163 MPFC contribution to effort-based decision making parallels its role in cognitive control -164 MPFC predicts the amount of effort (as well as reward) associated with certain environmental 165 cues, and the likelihood of the choice to engage or not in the required behavior. In other words, 166
we propose that MPFC monitors effort cues and decisions, with the same mechanisms used to 167 monitor the occurrence of any other stimulus and response outcome. 168
Decisions regarding whether to engage in an effortful task carry multiple consequences. First, 169 the choice to perform an effortful task entails exerting actual effort in order to perform the task 170 (regardless whether the task is performed successfully or not). Additionally, performing a task 171 carries with it the possibility of success, in which case the subject receives positive feedback, 172 often in the form of monetary reward. Alternately, the subject may fail to perform the task 173 successfully, in which case negative feedback is provided indicating failure. In the simulations, 174 such failure corresponds to not realizing the monetary reward, rather than losing money 175 (although a loss condition could also be simulated as easily). In the framework of the PRO 176 model, then, the outcomes predicted during choices regarding whether to engage in an effortful 177 task are 1) the level of effort to be exerted and 2) the potential expected payoff. Furthermore, 178 our implementation relies on two assumptions. First, greater effort is considered an aversive 179 outcome, which generally tends to be avoided if possible (Kool et al., 2010) . Second, as in the 180 original model implementation (Alexander & Brown, 2011) , outcomes can be more or less 181 salient: increasing levels of reward and effort correspond to increasing salience in the model. 182
This assumption is based on the observation that effort is frequently perceived as aversive, 183
plausibly generating increased arousal level. 184
Under these assumptions, we simulated effort-based decision making with the PRO model. The 185 parameter set used here was the same used in simulations reported in earlier work (Alexander 186 & Brown, 2011 , with no additions to the architecture of the model, and therefore not 187 specifically tailored to the current context (the code is available at 188 https://github.com/modelbrains/PRO_Effort). One should note that in this case the PRO model 189 is not performing the task itself, but rather monitoring the choice of engaging in more or less 190 effortful and rewarding trials (i.e. updating its predictions as a function of the experienced 191 effort and reward, as if the task had been performed), as opposed to accepting a default option 192 with a low reward value and no effort. In this formulation, MPFC activity reflects a monitoring 193 signal, tracking the (un)predictability of motivationally relevant variables, instead of explicitly 194 computing a cost-benefit trade off or driving choice. Related work (cf. Brown & Alexander, 195 this issue) suggests how signals generated by the PRO model may be deployed elsewhere in the 196 brain to drive choice behavior. Additionally, the adaptation of the PRO model to the context of 197 effort-based decision-making suggests that the role of MPFC is primarily in monitoring the 198 level of prospective reward and effort, and does not necessarily drive decisions to engage in a 199 proposed task, nor, once engaged, to maintain performance levels sufficient to realize 200 successful completion of a task. Rather, according with additional applications of the PRO 201 For simulations of the effort-based decision-making task, the model was presented a compound 207 cue indicating the level of prospective reward (4 levels) and level of prospective effort (4 208 levels). Each reward level was modeled as a single input unit, as was each effort level, for a 209 total of 16 unique compound stimuli reflecting combinations of effort and reward information. avoidance tendencies of human participants (see Figure 2a ): as the required effort (task 220 difficulty) increases, the probability of engaging in the task decreases (i.e. the prediction that 221 one will choose to engage). Plausibly, the prospect of a high reward changes this pattern: when 222 a higher reward is expected, the probability of engaging in more effortful tasks decreases only 223 slightly relative to low reward conditions. These behavioral predictions are consistent with linearly increases as a function of increased required effort (task difficulty) when reward 229 prospect is high. However, when reward prospect is low, MPFC activity increases less steeply 230 and only up to a certain degree of required effort, subsequently decreasing as the probability of 231 engaging in trials with high-demand for low reward drops. To our knowledge, this neural 232
prediction is yet to be tested and could be investigated by recording MPFC activity during 233 effort-based decision-making when difficulty is manipulated parametrically. 234
Alternative models of effort-based behavior 235
Other theoretical and computational models have been developed to account for MPFC 236 contribution to effort-based behavior (Shenhav et al., 2013; Verguts et al., 2015) . These models 237 present one major difference with respect to the PRO framework: they explicitly operationalize 238 effort as a cost to be computed in MPFC. As a result, while these models work well in 239 predicting effort-based decisions and task-performance, they do not provide an explicit 240 computational characterization of how MPFC contributes to other empirical effects. 241
Verguts and colleagues (2015) assign MPFC a role in calculating the benefit of deploying effort 242 in addition to signaling potential rewarding outcomes. Their adaptive effort investment model 243 operationalizes effort explicitly by implementing what the authors call "boosting". In this 244 model, units representing MPFC activity compute the value of boosting, namely exerting the 245 effort needed to energize a more difficult action (be it a physical action or a cognitive task). 246
Boosting, as in exerting effort, entails a cost. If the value of boosting outweighs the cost, the 247 more effortful action will be selected. This results in the following predicted pattern of activity: 248 overall activity in MPFC should be higher for larger rewards, increase with increasing task-249 difficulty as long as the reward is worth the effort, and drop for tasks too difficult to be solved. 250
To our knowledge, this prediction still requires empirical testing. In line with this model, 251 prediction error for the first, separate cost, benefit and consequences estimation for the second). 265
However, further modeling work is required to extrapolate predictions, which may disentangle 266 the models based on available empirical evidence.
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The main advantage of the PRO model is parsimony: the same architecture explains effort-268 related effects as well as a wide variety of empirical effects previously measured in MPFC 269 (ranging from prediction error, cognitive control, conflict and so forth, Alexander & Brown, 270 2011). This is not the case for the adaptive effort investment model, which is specifically 271 tailored for effort-based behavior and is therefore not applicable in other contexts, at least in its 272 current implementation. 273
One limitation of the PRO model is that it does not perform the task and is not responsible for 274 shortcoming common to both PRO and EVC/adaptive effort allocation frameworks is that they 282 are agnostic about cost computation. Effort is plausibly defined as a function of task-difficulty 283 and higher effort equals higher cost. However the nature and source of such cost signal, is a 284 topic of ongoing empirical and theoretical work (Holroyd, 2016; Kurzban et al., 2013) . 285
Predictions and implications for clinical populations 286
Adaptive decision-making and energization of behavior poses a challenge in several daily life 287 situations. In a number of psychiatric conditions, these mechanisms are impaired. Recent 288 studies showed that decision-making regarding whether to undertake an effortful task is altered 289 in depression, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia ( decisions. Such a complex picture confirms alteration of effort-based decision-making in such 303 clinical populations, and calls for more precise quantitative frameworks, able to identify the 304 mechanisms underlying different impairments. 305
Here, we use the PRO model, adapted as described above for modeling effort-related dynamics 306 in healthy subjects, to simulate the possible neuroetiology underlying clinical disorders, which 307 could explain the behavioral symptoms measured in clinical samples. In the PRO model, 308 outcome representation units may be modulated by salience (Alexander & Brown, 2011 ) 309
suggesting that compromised function in clinical populations may be a result of altered 310 perception of salient events (Alexander, Fukunaga, Finn, & Brown, 2015) . Model simulations 311 and theoretical predictions are described in Figure 3 . 312
These simulations use the basic architecture of the PRO model without modification as in 314 simulation 1. In order to simulate altered function during effort-based decision-making, we 315 assume that clinical disorders entail alterations in the processing of information related either to 316 reward or effort information. One possible alteration driving impairment in decision-making 317 could be attributed to a global salience change: in some populations, the global salience of 318 decision variables might be affected. Patients may be overly sensitive to the costs of engaging 319 in a task (such as required effort, simulation 2, Figure 3b ), or have reduced sensitivity to 320 potential reward (simulation 3, Figure 3c ). To simulate these hypotheses, we multiply the effort 321 level from simulation by a factor of 2 (simulation 2), or the reward information by a factor of 322 0.5 (simulation 3) to reflect increased effort salience or decreased reward salience. The results 323 of these simulations show that increasing the salience of effort and reducing the salience of 324 reward have similar effects in the model: the probability of engaging in a task is decreased over 325 all levels of reward and effort. The pattern of MPFC activity predicted by the model is also 326 severely attenuated relative to control simulation: activity is slightly higher in the high reward 327
as compared to low reward condition, but does not seem to track effort as it did in the control 328
simulation. 329
Another possible alteration underlying the impairment in clinical populations might be a 330 mismatch: predictions made by the model regarding effort and reward levels might not 331 correspond to veridical experience. The model may overestimate the level of effort required 332 (simulation 4) or underestimate the value of the reward on offer (simulation 5). The inability to 333 accurately estimate required effort and potential reward, would generate a mismatch between 334 prediction and outcome: predicted effort could be overestimated, leading to abnormal effort 335 avoidance, while mismatches between predicted and experienced reward could lead to 336 decreased motivation in performing the task. To simulate these hypotheses, effort-related 337 feedback to the model was multiplied by a factor of 2 (simulation 4), while the valence 338 information used for updating top-down control weights (Alexander & Brown, 2011, 339 supplementary Figure 1 ) remained unchanged. The net effect is that the model's prediction of 340 effort level exceeds the effort experienced by the model following choices to engage in an 341 effortful task. In simulation 5, reward-related feedback to the model was multiplied by 0.5 342 (while valence information was unchanged), with the interpretation that the level of predicted 343 reward did not match the experienced level. Simulation results for effort mismatch (Fig. 3d ) 344 and reward mismatch (Fig. 3e) show that such mismatches in effort and reward prediction yield distinguish between different types of effort costs, such as physical vs. cognitive effort. Here 366 we only assume higher effort to be more salient and aversive, irrespective of its specific nature. 367
Previous research comparing neural circuits involved in different effortful tasks (Schmidt, 368 Lebreton, Cléry-Melin, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2012) suggests that the type of effort 369 determined the network involved in task execution, with motor regions implicated in a physical 370 task as opposed to parietal regions implicated in a cognitive task. In both cases, the relevant 371 network was more active in the high effort condition. Moreover, a shared motivational hub was 372 Second, we do not include a mechanistic explanation of the aversive nature of effort. The 380 neural origin of this computation is still debated in the literature. It has been proposed that 381 perception of effort cost derives from its opportunity cost (i.e. engaging resources which could 382 be utilized differently, Kurzban et al., 2013) . A recent account hypothesizes effort cost to 383 derive from accumulation of waste product at the neural level, resulting from using up neural 384 resources (Holroyd, 2016) . The model is currently agnostic to the origin of this signal, which 385 we consider an avenue for future modeling and experimental work. 386
Third, we formulated effort-based behavior as a decision-making problem, where effort and 387 reward are considered outcomes of the decision to engage in the task at hand. However, this 388 does not account for monitoring ongoing effort exertion. Maintaining a certain level of vigor 389 throughout a period (e.g. holding a grip) could be seen as the result of a series of decisions to 390 keep engaging throughout the entire period, depending on (presumably striatal) cost and reward 391 signals fed into MPFC. This intriguing idea should be addressed in future modeling and 392 experimental work. 393
Fourth, we do not simulate MPFC activity variations within a trial. Theoretically, the PRO 394 model states that MPFC continuously predicts stimulus-outcome associations (Alexander & 395 Brown, 2014) . This means that at the beginning of a trial, prior to effort or reward related 396 information being presented, the model would predict average outcomes (in the context of 397 effort-based decision-making, these predictions would converge on the mean reward and effort 398 for the overall task). Following cue presentation, this prediction would be updated when 399 experiencing the actual effort, suggesting that MPFC activity should reflect the degree by 400 which task-related cues on a specific trial diverge from the average experimental value. 401
Preliminary evidence for such a computation is reported in a Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 402 study measuring motor-evoked potentials , which showed that motor 403 cortex excitability during cue presentation was related to prediction error in expected value 404 (discrepancy between average expected value and value of the actual cue on the current trial, 405
integrating a certain degree of required effort and potential reward). However, how this result 406 speaks to MPFC contribution in the process remains to be investigated. Conversely, activity 407 following the choice regarding whether to engage with an effortful task should vary inversely 408 with the tendency of the subject to engage: subjects with a lower overall tendency to engage in 409 effortful tasks should show increased MPFC activity following choices to engage, while 410 subjects with a strong tendency for engaging should show increased MPFC activity following 411 choices not to engage. These theoretical predictions require empirical testing, and possibly 412 additional modeling work to specify them quantitatively. From the methodological point view, 413 one would need to collect fMRI data at a time scale with sufficient resolution to contrast MPFC 414 activity at both cue and outcome, or to use EEG-fMRI simultaneous recordings to localize 415 MPFC electrophysiological signature. 416
Effort-based decision-making and performance in DLPFC 417
In the existing literature, the link between DLPFC and effort-based behavior is more implicit, 418 although it clearly emerges from the number of high-level functions implicating this region. Silvetti, et al., 2014). Across these studies, DLPFC activity increases as a function of expected 432 effort, task-load and working memory demands. Recently, starting from the principles outlined 433 in the PRO model, it has been proposed that the underlying computational mechanism of 434 DLPFC might also rely on the prediction and prediction error . The HER model is composed of 2 or more hierarchical layers, and each layer replicates the 439 functional form of the PRO model. The lowest layer receives input and feedback from the 440 environment, updating predictions via prediction error, computed as the discrepancy between 441 predicted and actual outcome. Additionally, the error signal also provides input to the layer 442 above, where it is treated as a feedback signal; in other words, this higher layer learns 443 predictions of the expected error of the lower layer, compares such prediction with the actual 444 error signal, and updates the error prediction accordingly. This simple architecture provides a 445 mechanistic account of how MPFC and DLPFC might interact, congruent with available 446 empirical evidence . The prediction error signal generated in 447 MPFC not only results in an updated error prediction at the highest layer: this prediction is also 448 linked to the environmental stimulus (or context), which was associated with the error. This 449 results in a representation linking the error signal to the stimulus (or context) that preceded the 450 error. In agreement with a substantial body of evidence, this model accounts for the primary 451 role of MPFC in performance monitoring and error detection, and for the role of DLPFC in 452 maintaining task-set representations providing context for MPFC function. 453
Future directions: translating the HER model to effort-based behavior 454
Despite its wide explanatory power, the HER framework has to date not been translated to the 455 domain of motivation to accommodate for the aforementioned effort and task-load effects 456 observed in DLPFC. In the previous sections we showed the potential of the PRO model to 457 explain effort-related effects. Fundamentally, the HER model is an extension of the PRO 458 model, which suggests it might be well suited for a comparable translation to the effort domain. 459
The aim of the current section is twofold. First we propose a theoretical explanation of how 460 DLPFC-MPFC interaction in the context of the HER model could account for motivational 461 effects observed in both regions. Second, we derive informal behavioral predictions from the 462 HER model in its current formulation which can be tested in both healthy and clinical 463 populations to further challenge the validity of the model. One should note that such 464 interpretations and prediction are highly speculative at this stage. The purpose of this section is 465 to provide a series of directions and predictions to drive empirical investigation of DLPFC-466 20 MPFC contribution to effort-based behavior. 467
The HER model is built on the principle that error signals in MPFC are equivalent to other 468 environmental feedback signals, and are therefore subject to the same prediction and error 469 processes. When an error signal is unexpected, the error prediction is updated. This error 470 history is stored in DLPFC as error representations linked to stimuli or environmental contexts. 471
This implies that when the same stimulus or environmental context reoccurs, the corresponding 472 DLPFC error representation is also reactivated. We hypothesize that this representation will in 473 turn up-regulate MPFC activity, reinstating the signal experienced at the time of error, but this 474 time with the purpose of exerting control to prevent the error from happening again (thus 475 leading to a better prediction, or a successful behavioral outcome). In this formulation, the 476 translation to a motivational context becomes evident: a performance error, for example due to 477 task difficulty, would be signaled by increased MPFC activity, tagging that particular 478 behavioral instance as requiring extra effort. Next time the same instance reoccurs, the 479 reactivated error representation can provide information necessary to inform top-down control 480
and resource allocation to result in successful task performance. Noteworthy, this speculative 481 explanation does not require an explicit operationalization of effort or other motivational 482 factors: thus, the HER model in its current architecture could be able to account for both 483 prediction-related as well as effort-related signals in MPFC and DLPFC. The empirical validity 484 of this explanatory framework is to be tested in future research, which should provide 485 neurobiological evidence for the type of MPFC-DLPFC dynamics described above. 486
Besides the theoretical implications for understanding PFC circuitry, the model relies on 487 assumptions that require empirical testing. The hierarchical structure of the HER model is 488 consistent with other accounts of PFC function, postulating the existence of a cortical rostro-489 caudal hierarchical gradient (Badre, 2008; Koechlin, 2016) . According to these theories, caudal 490 regions of PFC encode more concrete representations (action-related, or more recent in time), 491 while more rostral regions encode more abstract representations (task-sets, rules, context or 492 information further in the past to be maintained). This is implemented in the HER model, 493
wherein a typical simulation of a working memory task, different items to be stored in working 494 memory are encoded at different levels of the hierarchy (depending on order of processing, see 495 for example the 12AX task simulations in . An underlying 496 assumption is serial processing, not only for series of stimuli, but also for complex stimuli 497 remains open as to whether such simultaneous presentation results in simultaneous or serial 502 processing of the presented information sources, and to date this question has not been 503 addressed. The HER framework hypothesizes that such features would be processed serially in 504 a specific and preferred order. Simulations showed that altering this order, by imposing a non-505 preferred order, can impact performance . 506
Presenting motivationally salient information prior to task performance typically influences 507 accuracy, reaction time and task preparation in several tasks requiring cognitive control ( , 2014) . When applied to the domain of effort-based behavior, the order hypothesis predicts 511 that altering order of processing of reward and effort information might result in a shift in 512 perceived subjective value, and consequently affect (improve or deteriorate) performance. 513
Predictions and implications for clinical populations 514
These theoretical predictions naturally stem from the HER model, and empirical testing of their 515 validity carries relevant implications. First, testing these predictions will (dis-)prove the 516 22 validity of the assumptions underlying the model. Second, if altering order of processing can 517 alter decision-making, one could test the potential of such manipulation to improve 518 dysfunctional decision making, for example concerning health-related behavior such as 519 physical exercise and eating habits. Third, if altering order of processing can alter performance, 520 one could devise optimal ways to reconfigure available motivational information to improve 521 cognitive performance, for example in educational and school settings. Lastly, all of the above 522 have important implications for translational research and potential applications in clinical 523 populations affected by disorders of motivation. 524
To date, the predictions listed above have not been empirically tested. It is however useful to 525 speculate on the mechanisms, which could underlie such effects. One plausible explanation 526 involves salience. If effort and reward information is processed serially, the order of processing 527 when presentation is simultaneous may be influenced by the respective salience of informative 528 cues. Patients with depression typically show reduced willingness to exert effort to obtain a 529 reward: in other words they are more effort-avoidant as compared to controls (Treadway, improving decision-making and behavioral outcomes for these patients in daily life. 552
General discussion 553
This manuscript reviews the theoretical frameworks provided by the PRO and HER models, 554 modeling the neurofunctional architecture of MPFC and DLPFC. Such models have originally 555 been developed based on the core principles of prediction and prediction error to explain 556 empirical effects found in these regions. Here we discussed how these models may generalize 557 to the domain of motivation, focusing on effort-based behavior. We show that effort effects in 558 MPFC can be successfully accounted for by the PRO model, which provides further predictions 559 regarding behavior and neural activity in both healthy and clinical populations. Furthermore, 560
we discuss the potential translation of the HER model to the domain of effort-based behavior, 561 which accounts for empirical effects measured in DLPFC, and provides interesting empirical 562 predictions regarding the effect of order of processing on decision-making and task-563 performance: if these predictions are borne out, such effects could lead to the development of 564 useful interventions to influence altered perception of salience of effort and reward information 565 in clinical population, potentially improving abnormal behavior. 566
One primary goal of this manuscript is to emphasize the importance of exploiting precise 567 theoretical frameworks to derive predictions to test experimentally. The first advantage of such 568 mathematically precise frameworks resides in the ability to explain several behavioral and 569 neural effects observed in a brain region under the same computational principle. The second 570 advantage is the possibility to generate new predictions based on the same model, which can 571 translate to contexts to date untested or different populations. This feature is particularly useful 572 to guide further theory-driven empirical inquiry. In a scientific age where empirical tools 573 proliferate, basing experimental research on strong a priori hypotheses has become a necessary 574 condition to allow drawing statistically meaningful and generalizable conclusions. Finally, such 575 theoretical rigor and quantitative predictive precision provide a great tool to test potential 576 translational applications, with broad explanatory power for understanding the neurobiology of 577 disease. 578 high reward. The plot shows that model activity is overall higher when reward is high. 908
Moreover, when reward is high activity linearly increases as a function of increasing effort. shows four possible effort levels, parametrically increasing from easy (level 1) to hard (level 4). 916
Grey lines indicate low reward upon task completion. Black lines indicate high reward upon 917 task completion. a. Simulation 1. Behavioral and neural predictions for healthy controls. The 918 table on the right illustrates the hypotheses of possible impairments as modeled with the PRO 919 model, and relative explanation. We hypothesize two core possible mechanisms driving 920 impairments in patients. The first is altered global salience, with either an overall increased 921 effort salience (simulation 2), or an overall increased reward salience (simulation 3). The 922 second is mismatch between predicted and actual outcome, with either a possible 923
